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The article discusses the situation in Jordan after the recent elections. The elections, 
with a relatively high voter turnout, have not secured internal stability for good and the 
problems in Jordan remain. The Jordanian economic and social conditions will be have 
to be dealt with by the new government and the political reform process needs to be 
taken further. The elections have not dealt with a growing dissatisfaction and even 
criticism of the king himself – something of a novelty in Jordan, where the king are 
under pressure. Fortunately, seen from the viewpoint of the Jordanian regime, the 
Jordanian population as well as important external actors supporting Jordan seem to 
prefer stability to rapid change. 
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Introduction 
The elections to the Jordanian parliament which took place on the 23rd of January 2013 
have been met with some skepticism. The well-known Jordan-specialist Curtis R. Ryan 
asked in a comment just before the elections, if “this is a key turning point for reform in 
the kingdom, or mere cosmetic change?”, stating that “these elections will not answer 
these questions entirely” (Ryan, 2013). This seems to be a widely held view – both in 
Jordan and among scholars and journalists outside the Hashimite Kingdom. On the 
other hand: The Jordanian elections seem also to generate reasons for a slight 
optimism, as pointed at by Danya Greenfield from the Rafik Hariri Center for the 
Middle East at the Atlantic Council in Washington, who worked as an election 
observer in Zarga, a conservative university town northeast of Amman (Greenfield, 
2013b).  
Obviously the elections feed the notion that they changed only little and merely 
put off the real problems, which King Abdullah and the new government will have to 
deal with in the coming months and years. These problems have to do with internal 
issues related to the still far from perfect democratic election system, but not only that. 
Recently the regime itself has been exposed to hitherto unheard criticism, even directed 
against King Abdullah himself. The days where the royal leader was considered 
“untouchable” seem more or less to be gone. The king himself is in public discourse to 
an increasing degree referred to as part of the problem – a situation which a few years 
ago would be unthinkable. (Brand, 2013). 
 
 
The elections and the preliminary results 
The preliminary results of the elections, released by the newly-established Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC) and published by for instance Jordan Times, reveal that 
the members of the new parliament are not the same as the members of the resigned 
parliament. According to the IEC around 25 percent of the chairs will be occupied by 
returning members, which is a much lower figure than anticipated. Interesting 
novelties are that presumably the proportion of members with Palestinian-Jordanian 
background has gone up to more than 25 percent – from approximately 15 percent, and 
that the number of women also has increased.  
The reform of the election system stipulates that the quota of women should 
increase from 12 to 15, so the published list of new parliamentarians show 15 women’s 
names. But added to that apparently two women were able to jump the quota system 
by garnering enough votes outside the quota system to win seats. And furthermore 
two women head national lists and will based on success for their lists get into the new 




parliament. This, according to Greenfield, is not yet confirmed, but if it holds, 19 
women will be represented in the new parliament.  
The national lists represent officially an attempt to strengthen political parties, 
but in its preliminary mode it doesn’t really work to fulfil this ambition. Since the 
turnout has resulted in a situation where only three lists received votes enough for 
more than one seat, 23 different lists became represented in the new parliament. The 
IEC has informed the public that the number of voters who took part in the elections 
stood at 1,288,043 out of 2,272,182 registered voters and that this resulted in an overall 
turnout of 56.69 percent. The turnout has according to the IEC been very unevenly 
distributed – from around 90 percent at Karak’s 6th district to around 37,5 percent at 
Amman’s 2nd district with the percentage of male voters slightly higher than that of 
female voters.  
As mentioned by Jordan Times the day after the election King Abdullah 
described the parliamentary elections as a “success”, adding that consultations among 
blocs in the new House will start to designate a prime minister. This is also a novelty 
and in the coming days this will be followed closely by the Jordanian public. As 
Greenfield states “many are skeptical that he will follow through on that pledge” 
(Greenfield, 2013a). And regardless of if he lives up to the new procedure it seems 
plausible that the appointment of the new prime minister will only happen after 
behind the curtains consultations with the king and the powerful Jordanian secret 
services. The elections have not been flawless – reported incidents of vote-buying, 
campaigning inside the polling stations etc. contribute to painting a picture of an 
election system and election practices which are still far from perfect. It is difficult to 
estimate how much the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF calls for a boycott have 
affected the elections, but apparently the claims from their side that the result is 
inflated are not justified. At least domestic monitoring institutions have estimated 
voter turnouts close to the official figures. 
 
 
The elections and the regional challenges 
Obviously the elections do not solve the economic problems Jordan is facing. Jordan is 
severely hit by the international financial crisis and is more dependent on economic 
support from outside than ever. Recently (Nov. 2012) the government has found it 
necessary to cut fuel subsidies in a move to secure a $2-billion loan from the IMF. As a 
result protests erupted in which the slogans even targeted the monarch – a tendency 
which was unheard of before the wave of Arab Spring-inspired protests hit the 
kingdom in 2011-12. Further price hikes are announced and certainly this will inspire 
to renewed protest. 




Jordan receives financial help from the GCC-states and according to Jordan 
Times Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar in the fall of 2012 decided to extend 
$5 billion over a five-year period to support different development projects in Jordan. 
This support, however, comes at a cost. Jordan becomes more inclined to pursue a 
Gulf-oriented regional political agenda and for the time being this is not without 
problems. Saudi-Arabia, for instance, wants Jordan to support the Syrian opposition in 
its fight against the Bashar al-Assad regime and is said to have held back (some of) its 
promised aid to Jordan for the reluctance of doing so. 
At the same time Jordan is under pressure by the presence of several hundred 
thousand Syrian refugees in the country. UNHCR had 25 January 2013 registered 
206,630 Syrian refugees in Jordan, but the Jordanian government claims there are more 
than 300,000 Syrian refugees in the country. In January 2013 alone more than 30.000 
refugees arrived in Jordan. This compares to 16.400 in December, 13.000 in November 
and 10.000 in October, so the long-term tendency is very obvious, establishing a critical 
drain on the already problematic Jordanian economy.  
The new government will have to deal with these challenges. Maybe the 
existence of the many different problems has a paradoxical, positive backside, which 
even might have led to the relatively high voter turnout. Some observers claim that the 
deeply problematic situation in the large neighbouring state Syria influences the minds 
of the Jordanians and makes them fear the potential consequences for Jordan. Maybe 
the king can capitalize on this fear, but obviously only in so far as he to some degree is 
able to deliver on the many economic and social challenges facing the Jordanian 
population. 
The US also supports the Jordanian regime financially. Barack Obama only 
recently reentered the international political scene, but probably he will keep on 
supporting the Jordanian regime, which has an important peace agreement with Israel. 
The backing from the US will, all things being equal, contribute to stabilize the 
Hashimite Kingdom. The same is probably the case for the EU. The EU High 
Representative Catherine Ashton welcomed the elections results and emphasized that 
they are expressions of an ongoing reform process aiming at improving representation, 
governance and democratic accountability. She also mentioned the need for future 
political reforms without specifying what needs to be done. So both the US and the EU 
support Jordan and its incumbent autocratic leader. Probably none of them will raise 
demands at the king asking him to carry out dramatic changes in the political system 
or to change political preferences – be it internally or with respect to regional 
challenges.  
The interests in stability seen from an American as well as a European viewpoint 
stabilize the regime in Amman. Maybe this reality even can be considered a kind of 
conservative guarantee that the kingdom in Jordan relatively unchanged will survive 




for the coming years. Much depends on the internal development. The elections have 
not secured internal calm for good but seem to express that the Jordanian population 
as well as the international actors prefer the recent regime from something they don’t 
know of. The problems, however, remain. The Jordanian economic and social 
conditions will have to be dealt with and the political reform process needs to be taken 
further. Fortunately, seen from the viewpoint of king Abdullah, the Jordanian 
population as well as important external actors supporting Jordan seem to prefer 
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